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 ∗ The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, Chief United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Susan E. Affronti, Esq. 
Jennifer O. Andress, Esq. (Argued)  
Max C. Kaufman, Esq. 
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney 
3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
           Counsel for Appellees 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Robert Robinson appeals the District Court’s order denying his petition 
for habeas corpus on his claim that his convictions for both attempted murder and 
aggravated assault violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  Because Robinson’s double jeopardy claim is procedurally defaulted, we will 
affirm.   
I. Factual Background 
 Both of Robinson’s convictions at issue in this appeal arise from a violent episode 
in which Robinson both shot his victim in the stomach and hit the victim over the head 
with a gun.  As reflected in the trial testimony, the incident began when the victim, 
Kenneth Glenn, went to the home of an acquaintance with the intention of purchasing 
cocaine.  When he arrived, Glenn mistakenly rang the wrong doorbell and was told by a 
                                                 
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
neighbor that the acquaintance was not home.  Glenn apologized for the disturbance and 
returned to his car to wait.   
 At this point, Robinson emerged from the apartment whose doorbell Glenn had 
accidentally rung and ordered Glenn to get out of the car and give his money to 
Robinson.  When Glenn resisted, Robinson shot him in the stomach.  As Glenn tried to 
crawl back into his car, Robinson shot at him again and then hit Glenn in the head with a 
gun.   
 After a jury trial, Robinson was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated 
assault, among other offenses.  Of relevance to this appeal, when giving its instruction on 
the charge of attempted murder, the trial court explained that, in order to convict, the jury 
would have to find that Robinson shot the victim.  On the charge of aggravated assault, 
however, the trial court simply instructed that the jury would have to find that Robinson 
“caused serious bodily injury” to the victim without specifying that, if Robinson was 
found guilty of attempted murder, the shooting could not, in addition to serving as the 
ground for the attempted murder conviction, also constitute the “serious bodily injury” 
necessary to support an aggravated assault conviction.  App. 346.  Robinson received 
consecutive sentences for all counts totaling twenty-nine and one-half to seventy-two 
years of incarceration.   
II. Procedural History  
 Robinson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court arguing, among other 
things, that his sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault should have 
merged under Pennsylvania state law.  In making this argument, Robinson relied on the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20, 23-
24 (Pa. 1994), a case in which the Court held that aggravated assault is a lesser-included 
offense of attempted murder and that, therefore, when convictions for those crimes are 
based on the same criminal act, the sentences must merge.  The Superior Court rejected 
this argument, concluding the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for 
attempted murder based on the shooting and a conviction for aggravated assault based on 
the beating.  Thus, the Superior Court explained, because Robinson’s convictions were 
based on separate criminal acts, Anderson did not apply and there was no legal error in 
Robinson’s receiving consecutive sentences.   
 Robinson then sought the discretionary review of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  In his petition for review, Robinson again argued that his sentences for attempted 
murder and aggravated assault should have merged, but this time did not cite to 
Anderson, arguing only that the Superior Court erred in analogizing the facts of his case 
to those of Commonwealth v. Belsar, 676 A.2d 632 (Pa. 1996), a Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court case addressing when a prolonged violent episode involving both a shooting and a 
beating should be considered one criminal act versus two.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Robinson’s petition.   
 Robinson then filed a petition for collateral review under Pennsylvania’s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), raising only claims that are no longer at issue in this 
appeal.  The PCRA Court denied Robinson’s petition for relief, and the Superior Court 
affirmed that dismissal.   
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 Having been denied relief in state court, Robinson filed a petition for habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  In his habeas petition, Robinson raised, among other claims, a 
federal double jeopardy claim, arguing that he could not be lawfully convicted of both 
attempted murder and aggravated assault “without a jury verdict justifying the conclusion 
that the crime of attempted murder was based on the shooting and the aggravated assault 
was based on the pistol whipping.”  App. 95.   
 The District Court denied Robinson’s petition in full, and this timely appeal 
followed.1   
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  Because the District Court based its decision on the 
evidence contained in the state court record and did not engage in any independent fact-
finding, our review of the District Court’s denial of Robinson’s petition is plenary.  
McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1993).  
IV. Analysis  
 The Commonwealth contends that Robinson’s double jeopardy claim is 
procedurally defaulted and, in any event, meritless.  We agree on both points, and will 
therefore affirm.   
                                                 
 1 Robinson sought a certificate of appealability on a number of issues, but we 
granted it only as to “whether Robinson’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were 
violated by the imposition of separate punishments for aggravated assault and attempted 
murder.”  App. 3.   
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 A state inmate “shall not be granted” a writ of habeas corpus unless the inmate 
first “exhaust[s] the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1).  In order to properly exhaust a federal claim, the petitioner must have 
“fairly presented” that claim to the state courts—that is, the petitioner must have 
“present[ed] a federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner 
that put[] [the state courts] on notice that a federal claim [was] being asserted.”  
McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999).  If the petitioner fails to meet 
this exhaustion requirement and the state court to which he would be required to present 
his claims would now deem them procedurally barred, then “there is a procedural default 
for purposes of federal habeas regardless of the decision of the last state court to which 
the petitioner actually presented his claims.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 
n.1 (1991).   
Although a Pennsylvania inmate is not required to seek the discretionary review of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court before seeking habeas relief, Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 
F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir. 2004), if an inmate does petition for such review, the federal claim 
at issue must have been “fairly presented” in that petition, and the fact that a petitioner 
fairly raised his claim before a lower state court is not sufficient to satisfy the habeas 
exhaustion requirement, Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 30-32 (2004).  Robinson 
acknowledges that he never raised a federal double jeopardy claim in any state forum, but 
contends that, by raising a similar state law merger claim, he satisfied the fair 
presentation standard.   
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 Working in Robinson’s favor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that 
“there is no difference between a double jeopardy analysis and a merger analysis,” 
Anderson, 650 A.2d at 23, and our Court has recently held, in a case where the petitioner 
specifically cited to Anderson and argued the jury instructions given at his trial allowed 
for two convictions on the basis of a single criminal act, that the Pennsylvania merger 
claim raised by the petitioner in that case fairly presented a federal double jeopardy claim 
to the state court.  Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 229-31 (3d 
Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 18, 2018).  There, we concluded this argument, 
coupled with the petitioner’s citation to Anderson and its pronouncement that merger and 
double jeopardy employ an “identical” analysis, Anderson, 650 A.2d at 23, so resembled 
a double jeopardy claim that the petitioner had “asserted his claims in terms so particular 
as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution,” and his double jeopardy 
claim was not procedurally defaulted, Wilkerson, 871 F.3d at 229 (brackets omitted) 
(quoting McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261).  
 The problem for Robinson, however, is that while he cited to Anderson and made 
similar arguments in his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, he did not do so in 
his petition for review before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Instead, in that petition, 
Robinson argued that his sentences for aggravated assault and attempted murder should 
have merged as a matter of state law based only on Belsar, a Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decision that addressed when a continuous, single violent incident should be 
deemed two criminal acts instead of one under state law and that, unlike Anderson, made 
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no reference to a federal double jeopardy analysis.  See 676 A.2d at 633-36; cf. Anderson, 
650 A.2d at 23-24.   
 Moreover, Robinson did not argue to the state Supreme Court, as he does on 
federal habeas review, that due to errors in the jury instructions at trial, he was convicted 
of both crimes based on the single act of shooting of the victim.  Rather, Robinson argued 
only that the shooting and the beating were “one act” as a matter of state law because, in 
contrast to Belsar, the evidence at Robinson’s trial reflected that the attack was never 
“broken off” and then later resumed.  App. 197-98; see Belsar, 676 A.2d at 634.  This 
argument as to what evidence is sufficient under state law for a continuous attack to be 
deemed to involve two separate acts does not “call to mind a specific right protected by 
the Constitution,” McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261, and, coupled with only a citation to a 
state case that made no reference to federal law, was not sufficient to fairly present 
Robinson’s federal claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Cf. Wilkerson, 871 F.3d at 
229-31.  Because Robinson petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review, but 
did not fairly present his double jeopardy claim in that petition, that claim is procedurally 
defaulted and Robinson is not eligible for habeas relief.  Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 30-32.2 
                                                 
 2 Even if we could reach the claim that Robinson has raised on federal habeas—
that a double jeopardy violation occurred because “the charging instrument did not allege 
and the jury was not required to make a finding of fact that the attempted murder 
conviction was for the shooting and the aggravated assault was for the pistol whipping,” 
Appellant’s Br. 28—Wilkerson makes clear that claim would fail on the merits.  As we 
explained there, we may only grant a state inmate habeas relief if the state court’s 
decision denying relief was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and that standard is not satisfied when the state court 
rejects a double jeopardy claim based on its conclusion that the jury, given the evidence 
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V. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
denying Robinson’s petition for habeas corpus.  
                                                 
adduced at trial, could have returned the two convictions based on two separate criminal 
acts.  Wilkerson, 871 F.3d at 235.  Such was the case here, for just as in Wilkerson, the 
state court reviewed the trial record and concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to have convicted Robinson of attempted murder on the basis of the shooting and of 
aggravated assault on the basis of a different act, i.e., the beating.   
